The Fallacies of the Cyprus “Problem”

FILE PHOTO: Ο Πρόεδρος της Δημοκρατίας σε γεύμα με τον ηγέτη της τουρκοκυπριακής κοινότητας και τους Υπουργούς Εξωτερικών ή εκπροσώπους Υπουργών Εξωτερικών των εγγυητριών δυνάμεων, που παρέθεσε ο ΓΓ του ΟΗΕ, στο Κραν Μοντανά/ ΓΤΠ - Χ.ΑΒΡΑΜΜΙΔΗΣ


In the early morning of July 7, 2017, another round of negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations on the so called Cyprus “problem” has ended in Switzerland. Some are trying to understand why. Others, however, have ostensibly entered the “blame game” and/or misinformation, unjustly pointing the finger to the government of the Republic of Cyprus, because, allegedly, it did not make the necessary concessions, so as to satisfy Turkish demands. For those who are trying to understand why, I am arguing, hereinafter, that none should have expected these negotiations (or any previous) to succeed. They were doomed to fail for three reasons, which constitute the fallacies of the so-called Cyprus “problem”. 

Fallacy One

The first fallacy is that international actors, international organizations, diplomats, and analysts are trying to understand first and deal then with a “problem”, and not with a case of pure and brutal military invasion perpetrated by Turkey in 1974 and still preserved illegally until today.[1] This is where all starts and all ends: in the thought dominating (our) minds that we are to deal with a “problem” and not with a flagrant violation of almost all fundamental principals of the United Nations Charter and a series of non implemented compulsory decisions of the Security Council.


Αφήστε μια απάντηση

Η ηλ. διεύθυνση σας δεν δημοσιεύεται.